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This study investigates the relationship between Public Expenditure on Research and Development (PR&D) Venture Capital 
(VC) Investment. Using a comprehensive database of 40 countries: the OECD country-members plus Argentina, China, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore and South Africa, from 1998 to 2012, we find that PR&D has a positive effect on 
VC Investment. PR&D can affect some factors that could increase or reduce the expected rate of return for VC investments, 
but our outcomes indicate a net effect positive and PR&D does seem to generate value through fostering VC activity in the 
economy. This is especially true in countries with higher institutional quality and higher level of articles published by the 
scientific community. This could indicate two things: first, that PR&D is more efficient and strategically addressed in 
countries with high institutional quality; and second, it confirms that scientific production works in partnership with PR&D 
in generating VC opportunities. PR&D is more important for the generation of VC investments in countries with lower 
infrastructure; in these countries, the government decision for increasing PR&D takes more relevance in fostering active 
VC markets. The above conclusions are confirmed for early stage (ES), high technology (HT) and manufacturing sector 
(MS) venture capital investments, indicating that PR&D is specifically important for these three kinds of VC investments, 
however infrastructure availability remains definitive to increase MS venture capital investments. The results are based on 
a panel study controlling endogeneity with a generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator model with 
a collapsed instrument matrix and two lags. 
Keywords: Venture Capital, Public Expenditure in R&D, Institutional quality, High Technology Investments, Start-up.  
 
Introduction  
There is consensus in the literature about the importance 
of venture capital (VC) funds financing for new business 
creation (Black & Gilson, 1998; Hellmann & Puri, 2000, 
2002; Kortum & Lerner, 2000, Popov & Roosenboom, 2013). 
Companies in early development stages and inside of high-
tech industry sectors take advantage from VC funds 
investments, because they offer market knowledge, 
managerial guidance and greater risk tolerance (Gompers, 
1995; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002; Hsu, 2004).   
Recently a stream of research has been devoted to guide 
policy makers on taking special measures to promote VC 
market development (Jeng & Wells, 2000; Belke et al., 2002; 
Megginson, 2004). However, a few studies have focused on 
the relation between Public Expenditure on Research and 
Development (PR&D) and the creation of active VC markets. 
As economies become ever more dependent on innovation 
and creation of new sources for achieving sustained growth 
(like the produced by VC investments), PR&D has received 
a high priority in the economic policy agenda and has been 
absorbing large sums of public money, but we still know little 
about the benefits of PR&D in the creation of active VC 
markets. This paper contributes to fill that gap by providing a 
comprehensive study of the effect of PR&D on VC 
commitments. 
Previous studies have found that R&D expenditures are 
positively related to VC investments regardless of their 
sources (Gompers et al., 1998 for United States over 1976–
1994; Mondher & Kaouthar, 2011 for 21 European 
countries over 1997–2006; Romain & de La Potterie, 2004 
for 16 OECD Countries between 1990 and 2000; Adongo, 
2011 for 37 European countries) while others have not 
found a significant relation between the total R&D 
expenditure (Felix et al., 2007, for 23 European countries 
from 1992 to 2003) or Public R&D expenditure (Da Rin et 
al., 2006 for 14 European countries between 1988 and 2001) 
and the VC activity.  
Our focus is oriented specifically to shedding light on the 
effect of PR&D in generating VC activity and determining 
what economic conditions could affect the productivity of the 
possible benefits of PR&D on VC markets. We explore how 
this relation is affected when PR&D interacts with three 
relevant country-level factors that can make an environment 
more fertile for VC investment: institutional quality degree, 
scientific production level and infrastructure availability.  
For this purpose we use a panel data with a larger country 
sample and a bigger time period (40 countries: the OECD 
country-members plus Argentina, China, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Singapore and South Africa, from 1998 to 2012). 
Insofar, some researchers have identified a possible mutual 
interdependence of public and private R&D expenditures that 
could affect the relation between PR&D and VC investments 
(Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Becker, 2014; David et al., 2000), 
we advance introducing a difference and system GMM 
dynamic panel estimator model with a collapsed instrument 
matrix and two lags to control for endogeneity problems, 
obtaining more robust conclusions.   
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The Relation Between Public Investment on R&D 
(PR&D) and Venture Capital Commitments 
 
The influence of PR&D over VC industry can be 
analyzed using an adaptation of a familiar, rather elementary 
aggregate equilibrium model of fund-level investment 
behavior. At one point in time, an array of potential VC 
projects are available to invest in the market, VC funds in 
the market consider the expected cost and benefit streams 
for available projects and calculate its expected rate of 
return (ERR). VC funds use these rates of return to rank the 
associated projects in descending order of forecasted yield 
and forming a total return profile (TRP) to build a VC 
portfolio.   
TRP has a downward sloping in relation with VC 
investment amount and cross with the total cost profile 
(TCP) at break-even point of equilibrium (R*). In Figure 1, 
TRP and TCP are plotted on the vertical axis; while the 
horizontal axis represents the cumulated amount of 
investment required as one proceeds down the list of VC 
investment opportunities available in the market (demand 
for VC investments).  
The TCP reflects the minimum average rate of return 
required to cover expenses related with fund administration 
and the rate of return expected by the fund investors. The 
last one reflects the investor’s opportunity cost in relation 
with their risk appetite. Although the assumption of risk 
neutrality on the part of the fund is implied by the use of the 
ERR, the upward slope of TCP schedule over its full range 
reflects that VC resources are limited and as volume of VC 
investment is increased, the fund will require finance 
projects attracting recourses from external financing and 
this would tend to push its TCP upwards.  
In the next paragraphs, we use this framework to discuss 
how PR&D could increase and decrease TRP or TCP 
associated to VC aggregate fund portfolio and how it could 
affect funds decision to increase or reduce its investment 
commitments. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relation between Total Return Profile (TRP) and Total 
Cost Profile (TCP) for Venture Capital Funds 
 
 
PR&D and Increasing VC Investment 
Opportunities Return 
 
Existing literature about VC activity determinants 
mention that PR&D policy could lead to either an increase 
in the returns associated to TRP or a reduction on costs 
associated to TCP in several ways. PR&D can raise 
innovative output and expand scientific knowledge base. 
Schumpeter (1934) and Ames (1961) have mention that 
PR&D, through formalizing and making public 
advancements in different research fields, can lead to the 
generation of new valuable entrepreneurial ideas and 
marketable new products and processes, increasing the 
demand for VC investments.  
As is known, one of the rationales for PR&D is the 
correction of the market failures in the production of 
scientific and technological knowledge, arising from the 
‘‘incomplete private appropriability’’ problems identified 
by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962). In response to the 
tendency towards under provision of knowledge-based 
innovative effort on the part of private sector, governments 
have opted for the direct procurement or production in 
public facilities, for example financing public research 
institutes and national laboratories.  
Where public funds are intended for test facilities 
construction, durable research equipment acquisition and 
specialized research teams assembly, related VC investment 
opportunities can emerge at lower operational costs, and 
thereby it could derive in higher expected internal rates of 
return (Leyden & Link, 1991; David et al., 1992). 
Public funding of R&D can contribute indirectly, by 
generating knowledge spillovers and by complementing and 
stimulating private R&D expenditures. For example, the 
defense and pharmaceutical related research expenditures 
funded through public agencies may create social benefits 
in the form of knowledge and training spillovers. These 
spillovers emerge like opportunities to boost private sector 
productivity and encourage investments by VC funds 
interested in exploiting the technological innovations 
related, from which will flow future streams of cash flows 
(Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990; Acs et al., 1991; and, Toole, 
2007). 
The knowledge spillover from PR&D could reduce not 
only the costs associated to VC investment opportunities, 
but decrease the project costs variance and, simultaneously 
the risk perceived by VC funds. Additionally, these 
knowledge spillovers could encourage the “Horse Race” for 
proprietary inventions in the field (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1989), and this represents an incentive for VC funds to 
invest in projects related in order to take advantage of 
opportunities to increase its ERR.  
Government contract R&D could be a signal of future 
public sector product demand, as well as, future private 
sector demand in markets for dual-use goods and services. 
Venture Capitalists attentive to these signals could catch 
projects targeted to those markets. Similarly, Public R&D in 
a particular area may signal government intention to 
promote the use of a particular technology and this may 
entail either a future commitment to diffusion activities by 
public agencies, or favorable tax incentives for adoption of 
such technologies. Consequently the expected rate of return 
on VC financed projects in these fields would be raised.  
 
PR&D and Decreasing VC Investment 
Opportunities Return  
 
On the other hand, there is not few the academics who 
arrive to contrary conclusions: they found that some public 
R&D efforts have failed to provide significant commercial 
spillovers because inefficiency in the selection of 
government agencies and corruption generate a 
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misallocation of resources on low-impact projects (Cohen & 
Noll, 1991). In this case no significant effect would have 
PR&D in generating VC opportunities.  
An additional argument against benefits of PR&D over 
the returns of VC industry is that direct funding of R&D 
programs designated by government agencies prioritizes 
projects that are perceived to offer high marginal social rates 
of return. Such funding could be concentrated in areas 
where there is a large gap between the social and the private 
rate of return. In these cases, resulting ERR could be no 
attractive to VC funds because they need to ensure a 
minimum return to cover expenses related with fund 
administration and the rate expected by the fund investors. 
Sometimes, publicly funded research and development 
are earmarked by governments to the public domain. This 
could produce a crowding out effect over venture capitalist 
initiative (mainly in the high technology seed VC 
investments) in two senses: the first one, is that venture 
capitalist couldn’t enjoy the exclusive returns related with 
patents because property rights would be publicly held. The 
second one, is a displacement effect, Venture Capitalists 
might be discouraged from undertaking some investments 
because they wouldn’t want to compete with the government 
agencies. They would wait for outcomes of the governmental 
initiative because they know about state incentives to 
disseminate these outcomes. The resulting alteration push the 
shape of the TRP schedule downward and to the left, 
specifically for technological seed VC investments.  
The competition between the public and private sectors 
for specialized resources like human talent and facilities, 
can rise the prices of inputs used in technological VC 
investment opportunities, translating into higher costs for 
VC projects and reducing its ERR. Since technological VC 
projects require specialized inputs, in some countries the 
supply of, say researchers and engineers with particular 
expertise, can be low. The short-run impact of public R&D 
demand of this kind of inputs increases its costs and 
consequently, reduces the expected rate of return on the 
private sector’s investment, leading some VC projects to be 
curtailed – ceteris paribus.  
A last consideration in this sense could be that, where 
PR&D sends a signal of future public o private sector 
product demand in markets for dual-use goods or services 
and attracting Venture Capital investment (as was mention 
above), the resulting payoffs structure would induce 
wastefully duplicative private investments and be associated 
with excessive expenditures directed toward hastening the 
projects completion. The consequence could be not only a 
reduction in project rates of return; also these phenomena 
could generate overfunded sectors, whereas others are 
underfunded. 
As it can be concluded, the question about could private 
investment be crowded out by public investment in 
technological fields has been viewed in the larger context of 
the political economy literature. Many researchers have 
taken a critical position regarding the State intervention in 
the economy. As we mentioned the rationale for PR&D 
starts on the presupposition that too little research would be 
performed by private sector initiative, but intense concern 
surrounds the possibility that public allocations are 
substitutes of investments that private firms would 
otherwise undertake. There is a worry that the use of 
taxpayers ‘money has rendered far less effectual than might 
be supposed in augmenting society’s investment in 
generating technological progress (Bergstrom et al., 1986; 
David, 1997).  
Literature reviewed above allows us to identify a 
persisting lack of a clear-cut consensus about if PR&D 
encourage or displace the related private investment. 
Empirical works also show contradictory findings, for 
example, Robson (1993) concludes that there is a one-for-
one stimulus, Wallsten (1999) concludes that there is a one- 
for-one crowding-out, whereas Da Rin et al. (2006) find no 
evidence of an effect of increased public R&D spending on 
the VC activity, specifically for high technology and early 
stage VC investments.  
We have a considerable doubt about the idea that there 
is a universal relationship of a determined type, we think 
that this relation can be affected by other variables 
surrounding in the economy. Specifically, besides testing 
significance and direction of relation between PR&D and 
VC, we are seeking to explore how this relation is affected 
when PR&D interacts with three relevant country-level 
factors that can make an environment more fertile for VC 
investment: institutional quality degree, scientific 
production level and infrastructure availability.  
Data and Variables Description 
Information about venture capital investment comes 
from Thomson ONE, private equity database (venture 
capital module). The Thomson ONE database contains 
information for venture capital deals performed in 40 
countries studied: the OECD country-members plus 
Argentina, China, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore 
and South Africa, over a 14 year period, from 1998 to 2012.  
The dependent variable (Venture capital activity) is 
measured in terms of three proxies. The venture capital 
investment (vc_inv) indicates the total venture capital 
investment made at year i by country j. It is estimated as the 
natural log of one plus venture capital investment to 
economically active population ratio (18–64 years old) in 
each country-year (Popov & Roosenboom, 2013; Bottazzi 
& Da Rin, 2002; Da Rin et al., 2006; Kortum & Lerner, 
2000; Herrera-Echeverri et al., 2014). Second proxy is 
venture capital deals (vc_deal), which denotes the number 
of venture capital investment deals in each country-year. It 
is computed as the natural log of one plus venture capital 
deals to economically active population ratio (18-64 years 
old) (Cumming & Li, 2013; Sahaym et al., 2010). Finally, 
to check the conclusions robustness we use a probit model 
where total number of VC deals at year i by country j is the 
independent variable.  
To meet other study concerns, venture capital activity is 
calculated using three additional investments criteria: 
company development stage, company technological level 
and company economic sector. For the first criteria, the 
Thomson One’s Private Equity/Venture Capital database 
classifies investments in the following categories: seed, 
start-up, expansion, replacement capital, and buyouts. VC 
investments are defined as the sum of the first four 
categories. Early stages VC investments are the sum of the 
first two categories.  
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The second criterion identifies VC investments in high-
tech companies and it includes the following sectors: 
communications, computing and related, biotechnology and 
related, electronics, medicine and related. The third criterion 
identifies the VC investments in companies of the 
manufacturing sector, defined as the sum of investments in 
the 31, 32 y 33 business sector NAIC codes.   
The explanatory variable is proxy with “Ps_r+d” that 
measure Public expenditure on research and development 
(PR&D) at year i by country j as share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). PR&D represents public resources destined 
to activities undertaking for discovering or developing new 
products, including the improving of versions and qualities 
of the existing ones and the discover or the development the 
new or more efficient processes of production (SNA1, 
1993). The data is in local currency, for this research 
purposes was calculated as a share of GDP.  We work with 
annual flows of PR&D because this reduces positive serial 
correlation between dependent and independent variables2.  
Six control variables are included to ensure that the 
relation between explanatory variables and dependent 
variable can be authenticated. The first control variable is 
“Inst_qual”:  quality of institutions determined according to 
the most recent version of “Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI)” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010).  
Second control variable is the market capitalization 
“Mar_cap” is the share price multiplied by the number of 
issued shares of domestic companies listed in the stock 
market in the previous year; investment companies, mutual 
funds or other forms of collective investment are not 
included. A higher stock market capitalization is preferred 
for venture capital investments (Black & Gilson 1998; 
Gompers, 1995; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Megginson 2004; 
Nahata, 2008; Schertler & Tykvova, 2012).  
The third control variable proxies the innovation level 
of the country. “Art_pub” denotes the science & engineering 
articles published coming from country.To take into account 
the economic environment, we use the volume of imports 
and exports, “Trade” and GDP per capita.We use two 
variables to proxy the infrastructure development level of a 
country in a year: the Public expenditure in gross fixed 
capital formation (Public_fbk) as percentage of GDP and, 
the total road network reported in thousands of kilometers, 
which includes motorways, highways and other national or 
regional roads in a country (Road). 
By convention in the SNA 1993, all the outputs 
produced by research and development, staff training, 
market research and similar activities are treated like being 
consumed as intermediate inputs even though some of them 
may bring future benefits.  Intermediate consumption 
measures the value of goods and services that are 
transformed or entirely used up in the course of production 
during the accounting period. It does not cover the costs of 
using fixed assets nor expenditures on the acquisition of 
fixed assets. Therefore, no collinearity between Public_fbk 
and Ps_r+d is assumed. 
 
                                                          
1 The System of National Accounts (SNA) available on 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna2008.asp  
Empirical Methodology 
The aim of this research is to measure how PR&D 
influences the venture capital commitments in sample 
countries and extend that analysis to assess the effects of 
PR&D over three specific kinds of VC investments: early 
stage, high technology and manufacturing sector. For this 
propose, we use the panel data technique, where the main 
unit of observation is the VC investment in a country-year:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Equation (1) describes the model. Where Yit denotes the 
VC investment (sensibility issues are established for total, 
early stage, high technology and manufacturing VC 
investment). Xit and Zit indicates the associated variables to 
PR&D and control variables respectively to each country in 
a year. Di is a matrix of year dummies to control VC 
industry effects, which is common to all countries. Dj is a 
matrix of dummies to control country effects, taking into 
account the convergence phenomena (Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin, 1992). Finally, εit is the idiosyncratic error.  
We find temporal effects significance. Hausman 
Specification Test indicates fixed effects. Pesaran CD 
(cross-sectional dependence) Test was used to detect 
correlation of residuals across entities. Modified Wald Test 
and Wooldridge Test are used to detect heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation respectively. Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors, PCSE (Beck & Katz, 1995) estimators are used to 
solve contemporaneous correlation, autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems. With an appropriate period of 
time in the sample (14 years), it is possible to use the 
correction through PCSE models (Beck, 2001).   
Analysis of Results 
Public Expenditure on R&D and Venture Capital 
Commitments 
Table 1, column (1) shows the estimates from the basic 
panel data regression. The Dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of VC investment scaled by economically active 
population (vc_inv) and the main explanatory variable is 
Public expenditure on R&D (Ps_r+d) as share of GDP. The 
coefficient is significant and positive, implying that the VC 
is higher in countries with higher PR&D. The numerical 
interpretation of regression coefficient is: increasing PR&D 
in a 1 % of GDP would increase the VC on average 36,620.7 
dollars per inhabitant economically active. This simple first 
empirical test confirms the complementarity between 
private VC investment and public R&D investment. 
Because PR&D can take more than a year to show 
results in Model (2), an alternative PR&D measure is used, 
the 3-year average of public expenditure on R&D (Ps_r+d_3 
year). In this case the resulting coefficient is again positive 
and significant and its magnitude implies that on average VC 
investment level is higher in countries with greater PR&D. 
However, before addressing endogeneity concerns the above 
results should be seen with caution. 
In table 1, models (1) using PR&D and (2) using 3-year 
average PR&D, show a positive and significant coefficient 
2 That could happen when the stocks of PR&D are used in the regression 
models. 
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between VC investment and PR&D. This relation is tested 
once again in models (3) and (4) using PR&D and in model 
(5) and (6) using 3-year average PR&D but this time control 
variables are included in the models.  All control variables 
show the behavior predicted in the literature (Lagged 
Inst_qual, Mar_cap, Art_pub, GDP and Road show a 
positive and significant coefficient in relation with VC at 1 
% or/and 5 %) and the relation between PR&D and 3-year 
average PR&D with VC investment follows positive and 
statistically significant. Results persist after controlling 
country specific developments that vary over time. 
Table 1 
VC Investment and PR&D 
Independent  
variables 
VC investment (vc_inv) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged vc_inv       
        
Ps_r+d 366,2  167,1 128,9   
  (54.9)***  (50.3)*** (60.1)**   
Ps_r+d_3 year  409,6   185,95 174,23 
   (59.1)***   (56.7)*** (67.5)** 
Inst_qual   0,55 0,63 0,56 0,54 
    (0.15)*** (0.23)*** (0.16)*** (0.23)** 
Mar_cap   0,004 0,007 0,003 0,004 
    (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)** 
Art_pub   0,014  0,015  
    (0.00)***  (0.00)***  
Trade   0,003 0,001 0,003 0,003 
    (0.001)* (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP   0,02 0,03 0,026 0,032 
    (0.006)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
Road    0,39  0,47 
     (0.06)***  (0.06)*** 
Constant 1,58 2,22 0,23 0,25 0,12 -0,02 
 (0.4)*** (0.4)*** (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R² 0,40 0,35 0,53 0,53 0,48 0,45 
Observations 422 422 385 336 390 353 
Countries 36 36 36 35 37 39 
Model PCSE ar(1), het 
 
To advance in testing the positive relation between VC 
and PR&D, another robustness check is made using another 
proxy for VC. The natural logarithm of the number of VC 
deals scaled by economically active population (vc_deal) is 
included to confirm the outcomes obtained to this point. 
Table 2, columns (1) to (6) show again that PR&D and 3-
year average PR&D remain positive and significant both at 
1 % or/and 5 % level in all models, including the models 
(10) to (13) where control variables were incorporated (note 
that control variables maintain the behavior presented in 
equations (3) to (6)). The conclusion is PR&D and 3-year 
average PR&D have a positive and significant relationship 
in increasing both the amount of investments and the 
number of VC deals.  
Finally, a different specification was included in table 3 
to check the robustness of above conclusions. In columns 
(2) and (3), total VC deals in a country-year is used as a 
dependent variable to regress with PR&D and 3-year 
PR&D. Taking into account the discrete nature of the 
number of VC deals, the initial specification is replaced with 
a Probit model. The coefficients of the explanatory variables 
do not change and they are significant at 5 % in the case of 
the lagged PR&D and at 10 % in the case of 3-year average 
PR&D.  
Endogeneity and Selection 
The empirical methodology followed to this point may 
be exposed to endogeneity problems. Positives coefficients 
in the models do not imply necessarily causality between 
PR&D and VC. Becker (2014) mentioned that private and 
public R&D investment respond together to expectations of 
future technological shocks. This may result in endogeneity 
bias because governments and VC funds can guide their 
investment efforts in the same line of action. In general, 
strict exogeneity would imply that technological shocks do 
not affect simultaneously current PR&D, and VC. 
Obviously this assumption is difficult to hold, and this 
implies a possible endogenous relationship between VC and 
PR&D. 
Table 2 
VC Deals and PR&D 
Independent 
variables 
VC deals (vc_deal) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged vc_inv       
        
Ps_r+d 165,9  120,5 113,5   
  (41.5)***  (38.6)** (43.0)**   
Ps_r+d_3 year  287,8   191,6 189,7 
   (48.3)***   (41.2)*** (43.8)*** 
Inst_qual   0,55 0,61 0,65 0,65 
    (0.14)*** (0.21)*** (0.15)*** (0.24)*** 
Mar_cap   0,001 0,003 0,001 0,001 
    (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) 
Art_pub   0,007  0,006  
    (0.002)***  (0.002)***  
Trade   0,002 0,001 0,002 0,002 
    (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)* 
GDP   0,012 0,013 0,003 0,008 
    (0.005)*** (0.007)** (0.006) (0.007) 
Road    0,23  0,23 
     (0.46)***  (0.05)*** 
Constant 1,22 1,29 0,23 0,19 0,13 -0,04 
 (0.27)*** (0.29)*** (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R² 0,48 0,44 0,56 0,57 0,54 0,55 
Observations 422 422 386 337 392 355 
Countries 36 36 36 35 37 39 
Model PCSE ar(1), het 
 
Likewise, the analysis of complementary and substitutes 
effects of public R&D over private investment in David et al 
(2000) mentions the possible mutual interdependence 
between public and private R&D expenditures. Omitted 
variables in the aggregate models can affect simultaneously 
VC and PR&D and be correlated with both, the public and the 
private R&D investment decisions. 
One simple way to account for the possible endogeneity 
of current VC and PR&D is to use lagged values of PR&D. 
All the models in this work used lagged valued for 
independent and control variables. Lagged PR&D should be 
less correlated with current VC and hence should partially 
address the concern that VC investors and governments 
react the same way to current technology opportunities. A 
similar argument can be wielded to deal with the correlation 
that can emerge because the omitted variables in the 
aggregated models. 
However, lagged PR&D variables are not a perfect 
solution to the endogeneity problem since VC investment 
opportunities and PR&D dynamics are likely to be correlated 
along longer periods.  To address the econometric challenge 
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that this fact represents and obtain unbiased estimators in the 
models, we use difference and system GMM dynamic panel 
estimator model with a collapsed instrument matrix and two 
lags3 (Roodman, 2009).  
In table 3, the estimates from the 2SLS procedure are 
reported in column (1) where VC is regressed against the 
lagged PR&D (Ps_r+d) and the lagged VC (Lagged vc_inv).  
In both cases, the sign is positive and the effect is significant 
at the 10 % and 5 % statistical level, implying that the 
relevance condition is satisfied and the relationship between 
public R&D and VC continues strong after taking in account 
possible endogenous issues. In the same way that previous 
models tested in this paper, the behavior of all control 
variables after 2SLS procedure remains consistent. The p-
value associated to the Hansen J-test required for the 
difference and system GMM dynamic panel estimator 
model, reject the null hypothesis indicating the validity of 
the instruments and the over-identifying restriction 
condition fulfillment. The robustness of above results is 
confirmed by Diff-in-Hansen test (excluding group and 
difference). 
Table 3 
VC and PR&D Robustness 
Independent variables 
Second Stage  
vc_inv 
 
Total VC deals 
  (7) (14) (15) 
Lagged vc_inv 0,22   
  (0.11)**   
Ps_r+d 262,8 149,35  
  (262.8)* (75.48)**  
Ps_r+d_3 year   136,82 
    (83.61)* 
Inst_qual 0,52   
  (0.24)**   
Mar_cap 0,004   
  (0.002)   
Art_pub 0,008   
  (0.004)**   
GDP 0,017   
  (0.014)   
Constant  1,28 1,49 
  (0.39)*** (0.47)*** 
Time dummies yes No No 
Observations 400 422 422 
Countries 39 36 36 
Model 2SLS_GMM Probit  
Sensibility to Country Environment Characteristics 
In following tables we analyze the country 
characteristics of the business environment that, in theory, 
can affects the productivity of PR&D to generate VC 
investment. We interact PR&D with four relevant country-
level variables that can make a country more fertile for VC 
investment: Institutional quality (inst_qual), the science & 
engineering articles published coming from the country 
(art_pub), the Public expenditure in gross fixed capital 
formation (Public_fbk) as share of GDP and the total road 
network reported in a country (Road). 
In Table 4, column (1), PR&D interacts with 
institutional quality for countries with high 
(Ps_r+d*Inst_qual_high) and low (Ps_r+d*Inst_qual_low) 
                                                          
3 GMM estimators are accomplish by xtabond2 package in Stata (further 
information see Roodman, 2009) 
institutional quality (above or below the media, 
respectively). Coefficients magnitude shows that the effect 
of PR&D is greater in countries with higher institutional 
quality. Column (2) shows the same result using the 
interaction between PR&D with low and high institutional 
quality, both calculated with a three-year average (Ps_r+d_3 
year* Inst_qual_low_3 year and Ps_r+d_3 year* 
Inst_qual_high_3 year, respectively). The magnitude of the 
resulting coefficients confirms that PR&D is more 
productive in countries with high institutional quality.  
Table 4 
Sensibility to Inst_qual and Art_pub 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: VC investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d* 149.45    
 Inst_qual_low (60.44)**    
Ps_r+d* 177.16    
 Inst_qual_high (55.24)***     
Ps_r+d_3 year*   118.98   
 Inst_qual_low_3 year  (40.24)***    
Ps_r+d_3 year*   138.48    
 Inst_qual_high_3 year  (41.01)***    
Ps_r+d*   68.44  
 Art_pub_low   (46.25)  
Ps_r+d*   160.40  
 Art_pub_high   (38.50)***   
Ps_r+d_3 year*    95.46 
 Art_pub_low_3 year    (41.37)** 
Ps_r+d_3 year*     166.46 
 Art_pub_high_3 year    (38.00)*** 
      
Inst_qual 0,55 0,61 0,617 0.68 
  (0.19)*** (0.17)*** (0.15)*** (0.16)*** 
Mar_cap 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 
  (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) 
Art_pub 0.013 0,007 0.004 0.004 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Trade 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.0013) (0.001)** (0.001)* 
GDP 0.024 0.006 13.00 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)** (0.005) 
Constant 0.379 0.447 0,18 0,299 
  (0.306) (0.211)** (0.198) (0.191) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
R² 0,404 0,586 0,522 0,599 
Observations 422 339 422 339 
Countries 36 36 36 36 
Model PCSE ar(1), het 
 
In this case, PR&D is complementary to institutional 
quality, implying that the benefits of PR&D on new VC 
investment generation improve when the levels of 
institutional quality are higher. This could indicate that the 
PR&D is more efficient and strategically addressed in 
countries with high institutional quality.  
Countries with low institutional quality can report high 
levels of PR&D but the final destination of these resources 
can be affected by political compromises or other 
phenomena of this type that could reduce the positive effect 
if the PR&D resources are not well localized (Herrera et al., 
2014).  
Another explanation for this effect could be that high 
institutional quality provides a stronger protection of 
intellectual property rights ensures a higher return to 
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investment. In countries with lower levels of institutional 
quality, the protection of venture capitalists may be deterred 
by the fact that the system will not protect innovative products 
adequately (Antonelli & Teubal, 2008).  
In column (3), PR&D interacts with articles published. 
Countries with high (Ps_r+d*Art_pub_high) and low 
(Ps_r+d*Art_pub_low) level of articles published (above or 
below the media, respectively). Coefficients show that the 
effect of PR&D is greater in countries with higher level of 
articles published. 
Table 5 
Sensibility to Roads Paved and FBK 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: VC investment 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ps_r+d* 143.75    
 Road_low (52.74)***    
Ps_r+d* 130.77    
 Road_high ( 43.46)***    
Ps_r+d*  202.11   
 Road_low_3 year  (50.6048)***   
Ps_r+d*  148.77   
 Road_high_3 year  (44.63)***   
Ps_r+d*   227.79  
 Public_ fbk_low   (43.64)***  
Ps_r+d*   219.01  
 Public_ fbk_high   ( 44.26)***  
Ps_r+d*    265.29 
 Public_ fbk_low_3 year    ( 49.37)*** 
Ps_r+d*    237.16 
 Public_ fbk_high_3 year    (49.82)*** 
Inst_qual 0.57 0.63 0.40 0.46 
 (0.21)*** (0.20)*** (0.17)** (0.173)*** 
Mar_cap 0.003 0.002 0.003 0,001 
 (0.001)** (0.001) (0.0011)*** (0.001) 
Art_pub 0,007 0.008 0.005 0,0043 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.0017)*** (0.002)** 
Trade 0.002 0.001 0,0038 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0019)** (0.0023) 
GDP 0.01 0.0001 0,0073 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0 .0054) (0.006) 
Constant 0.10 0.289 -0.207 0,101 
 (0.20) (0.215) (0.283) (0.318) 
Time dummies No yes No yes 
R² 0,516 0,506 0,545 0,514 
Observations 347 388 334 356 
Countries 38 37 35 33 
Model PCSE ar(1), het 
  
For robustness, we test again the result using the 
interaction between 3-year average PR&D with low and 
high level of 3-year average articles published (Ps_r+d_3 
year* Art_pub_low_3 year and Ps_r+d_3 year* 
Art_pub_high_3 year in column 4). Once more, the 
magnitude of the resulting coefficients confirms that PR&D 
is more productive in countries with high level of articles 
published. This result broadly confirms a strand of literature 
(before cited), which has documented the value of the 
scientific production in fostering the VC industry. In this 
case, scientific production is complementary to PR&D, 
implying that the benefits of PR&D on new VC 
commitments is increased if the scientific community is 
under conditions to intensify their production properly. 
Next, we address aspects related with country 
infrastructure condition.  Results obtained in this case are 
somewhat counterintuitive. The effect of PR&D on VC is 
stronger in countries with low infrastructure. In table 5, 
columns (1) and (2) PR&D and 3-year average PR&D 
interact with total previous year and 3-year average road 
network for countries below and above of the sample media 
(Ps_r+d*Road_low, Ps_r+d*Road_ 
high,Ps_r+d*Road_low_3year and Ps_r+d*Road_ high_ 
3year, respectively). The coefficients are positive, significant 
and their magnitude is higher in countries with lower road 
network for both cases, using the total previous year or 3-
year average road network.  
Table 6 
Early stage VC and Inst_qual 
Independent variables Early stage VC Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d 127,50    
 ( 42.67)***    
Ps_r+d_3 year  143,65   
   (38.84)***   
Ps_r+d*   74,14  
 Inst_qual_low   (61.37)  
Ps_r+d*   111,72  
 Inst_qual_high   (46.84)**  
Ps_r+d_3 year*    100,94 
 Inst_qual_low_3 years    (64.95) 
Ps_r+d_3 years*    118,38 
 Inst_qual_high_3 years    (52.27)** 
Inst_qual 0,25 0,31 0,62 0,57 
  (0 .12)** (0.11)*** (0.15)*** (0.19)*** 
Mar_cap 0,006 0,005 0,006 0,005 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Art_pub 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,012 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
GDP 0,0313 0,027 0,02 0,024 
  (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Constant -0,35 -0,38 -0,35 -0,52 
  (0.16)** (0.16)** (0.24) (0.30)* 
Time dummies No yes No yes 
R² 0,46 0,43 0,47 0,36 
Observations 389 425 355 349 
Countries 38 38 35 34 
Model PCSE, het PCSE, het PCSE, ar(1), het PCSE, het 
  
It is known that the infrastructure favors profitability 
and volume of investment (Morrison & Schwartz, 1996; 
Justman, 1995; Kohei & Tabata, 2013). However, an 
explanation for the last result could be that the PR&D is 
more important for the generation of VC investments in 
countries with lower infrastructure. The conclusion is that 
in countries with less infrastructure PR&D becomes more 
important and these countries should make a greater effort 
in PR&D to increase the volume of VC. To check the 
robustness of this result in columns (3) and (4) PR&D and 
3-year average PR&D interact with total previous year and 
3-year average Public expenditure in gross fixed capital 
formation as percentage of GDP (Ps_r+d*Public_ fbk_low, 
Ps_r+d*Public_ fbk_high, Ps_r+d*Public_ fbk_low_3 year 
and Ps_r+d*Public_ fbk_high_3 year, respectively). As we 
mentioned in section 3.3, gross fixed capital formation is 
used as proxy for country infrastructure in this case. 
Significance, sign and magnitude of coefficients in columns 
(3) and (4) confirm the last conclusion: In countries with 
lower levels of infrastructure, the government decision for 
increasing PR&D is more important to foster VC 
activity.This finding can be related with the Finnish and 
Swiss economic development cases. Both countries are in the 
top ten VC activity of our sample, however they are not in 
high positions of the infrastructure investment ranking in the 
same sample proportionally. Culture (2010) mentions that the 
engine of 2011–2015 policy economic guide for development 
and productive transformation in Finland was the public 
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spending in research and innovation (it was allocated 114 
euros per capita in PR&D). Finnish model, oriented to 
funding innovative startups, has positioned this country like 
the second innovative country of Europe (WEF, 2014). 
Switzerland has adopted a similar policy (SERI, 2013) and 
actually it is ranked like the first European innovative 
country (WEF, 2014). 
Sensibility to Stage, Level of Technology and 
Sector of Investment  
We advance testing the relation between PR&D and VC 
activity, specifically for three different kinds of investments: 
early stage (ES, tables 6 and 7), high technology (HT, tables 
8 and 9) and manufacturing sector (MS, tables 10 and 11). 
Coefficients associated with public investment in research 
and development (Ps_r+d) are positive and significant at 1 % 
in all three cases, implying that ES, HT and MS venture 
capital investments are higher in countries with higher PR&D 
(column 1 of tables 6,8,10). 
Table 7 
 Early stage VC, Road Paved and Art_Pub 
Independent variables Early Stage VC Investments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d* 147,77    
 Art_pub_low (65.90)**    
Ps_r+d* 223,84    
 Art_pub_high (54.98)***    
Ps_r+d_3 year*  136,47   
 Art_pub_low_3 years  (45.85)***   
Ps_r+d_3 year*  231,91   
 Art_pub_high_3 years  (43.31)***   
Ps_r+d*   105,37  
 Road_low   (55.32)**  
Ps_r+d*Road_high   93,39  
 Road_high   (47.07)**  
Ps_r+d*    131,13 
 Road_low_3 year    (54.71)** 
Ps_r+d*    126,68 
 Road_high_3 year    (47.8)*** 
Inst_qual 0,30 0,30 0,27 0,36 
  (0.17)* (0.12)** (0.1724) (0.17)** 
Mar_cap 0,006 0,006 0,009 0,007 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Art_pub 0,005 0,004 0,0104 0,011 
  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.0015)*** (0.002)*** 
GDP 0,033 0,037 0,028 0,022 
  (0.011)*** (0.007)*** (0.01)*** (0.009)** 
Constant -0,62 -0,74 -0,29 -0,29 
  (0.24)** (0.15)*** (0.16)* (0.17) 
Time dummies yes yes No yes 
R² 0,41 0,54 0,46 0,37 
Observations 351 369 351 407 
Countries 35 35 38 38 
Model 
PCSE ar(1), 
het 
PCSE, het PCSE, het PCSE, het 
 
Last result is checked using the 3-year average of public 
expenditure on R&D (Ps_r+d_3 year) as an explanatory 
variable; again coefficients are positive and significant at 1 
% in all cases (column 2 of tables 6,8,10). In all models, the 
explicative variables’ coefficients are estimated using 
control variables and outcomes associated to all of them 
follow consistently the expected behavior according to the 
theory. The emerging conclusion is that public investment 
in research and development is important, not only to 
encourage venture capital commitments in high technology 
investments, but also it benefits manufacturing industry and 
firms in early stages of development. Other studies like Da 
Rin et al. (2006) suggest that increasing public R&D does 
not result in a higher early stage or high tech entrepreneurial 
ventures. A reason could be they use as dependent variable 
innovation and early stage ratios (HT-VC investment to 
total private equity –PE- investment and ES-VC investment 
to total VC investment). These measures do not take into 
account the increases in ES and HT venture capital 
investments when the total PE or total VC investment grows 
above ES and HT investments, and that can be critical, 
especially in years which PE and VC industry have had 
great expansions in general (for example some years in our 
sample).  
Our conclusion is in line with the approach of Leyden 
and Link (1991) and David et al. (1992); these authors agree 
that technological knowledge and market information 
associated with publicly funded R&D could result in 
“spillovers” for firms in the same industry or related 
industry sectors.  Acs et. al (2009) arguments are in the same 
line, they mention that spillovers increase the opportunities 
available to entrepreneurs and show a strong relationship 
between knowledge spillovers and new venture creation.  
PR&D performed in academic and other non-profit 
institutions, including government laboratories could have 
positive spillover effects, particularly where the research 
produces general principles, tools and techniques, and 
access to skills that could rise the expected returns of 
commercially oriented applied R & D projects and as well 
as generate incentives to VC investment in diverse 
economic sectors. 
Table 8 
 High Tech VC and Inst_Qual 
Independent variables High Technology VC investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d 204,38    
  (53.94)***    
Ps_r+d_3 year  273,81   
   (64.91)***   
Ps_r+d*   189,61  
 Inst_qual_low   (60.87)***  
Ps_r+d*   213,05  
 Inst_qual_high   (56.11)***  
Ps_r+d_3 year*    189,44 
 Inst_qual_low_3 year    (71.83)*** 
Ps_r+d_3 year*    273,57 
 Inst_qual_high_3 year    (68.35)*** 
Inst_qual 0,71 0,75 0,651 0,562 
 (0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.21)*** (0.205)*** 
Mar_cap 0,005 0,004 0,005 0,003 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002)*** (0.002)* 
Art_pub 0,013 0,015 0,013 0,014 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
  
  
Independent variables High Technology VC investment 
GDP 0,023 0,012 0,022 0,014 
 (0.00)***  (0.00) (0.00)***  (0.00) 
Constant -0,12 -0,27 -0,05 -0,03 
 (0.257) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29) 
Time dummies Yes yes Yes yes 
R² 0,47 0,40 0,48 0,42 
Observations 402 437 402 403 
Countries 39 39 39 39 
Model PCSE ar(1), het 
 
In column 3, we turn to analyze the characteristics of 
the country environment, but this time differentiating the 
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effects of PR&D over ES (table 6), HT (table 8) and MS 
(table 10) venture capital investments. We start interacting 
PR&D in countries with low (Ps_r+d*Inst_qual_low) and 
high (Ps_r+d*Inst_qual_ high) level of Institutional quality, 
below or above the media, respectively. We find that the 
effect of PR&D on ES, HT and MS venture capital 
investments depends on institutional quality. Once again, 
coefficients show that the effect of PR&D is greater in 
countries with higher institutional quality for three kinds of 
VC investments studied, but for ES-VC investment the 
coefficient looses its significance when the institutional 
quality is low, indicating that institutional quality is 
particularly critical for these kinds of investments. 
Table 9 
High Tech VC , Road Paved and Art_Pub 
Independent variables High Technology VC investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d* 119,46    
 Art_pub_low (61.47)*    
Ps_r+d* 243,03     
 Art_pub_high (52.76)***     
Ps_r+d_3 year*  95,66    
 Art_pub_low_3 year  (48.99)**   
Ps_r+d_3 year*  278,73   
 Art_pub_high_3 year  (43.91)***   
Ps_r+d*   196,22  
 Road_low   (69.34)***  
Ps_r+d*   157,83  
 Road_high   (62.03)**   
Ps_r+d*     213,60 
 Road_low_3 year    (71.09)*** 
Ps_r+d*    211,63 
 Road_high_3 year    (63.03)*** 
Inst_qual 0,81 0,79 0,75 0,74 
  (0.19)*** (0.14)*** (0.25)*** (0.23)*** 
Mar_cap 0,005 0,005 0,008 0,007 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Art_pub 0,009 0,008 0,013 0,014 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
GDP 0,022 0,024 0,018 0,018 
  (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.011)* (0.011)* 
Constant -0,053 -0,225 -0,027 -0,211 
  (0.266) (0.179) (0.277) (0.256) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0,49 0,54 0,49 0,44 
Observations 402 437 351 409 
Countries 39 39 38 39 
Model PCSE ar(1), het 
 
The last result coincides with early stage investments 
characteristics. Because these investments are associated 
with high uncertainty, more risk and greater difficult of 
monitoring, a greater possibility exists for potential moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in relations 
established by venture capitalist (Amit, Brander & Zott, 
1998; Gompers 1995; Kaplan & Stromberg 2004). Without 
strong institutions enforcing deals, governmental efforts in 
PR&D loose their productivity to generating VC activity. 
Coefficient reduction for low institutional quality when the 
model is calculated interacting 3-year average public 
spending on R&D with low (Ps_r+d_3 year* 
Inst_qual_low_3 year) and high (Ps_r+d_3 year* 
Inst_qual_high_3 year) 3-year average institutional quality 
for the three kind of VC Investment (column 4 in tables 6, 8 
and 10), confirms that PR&D reduces its productivity 
generating VC investments in that case. 
We also find that PR&D increases its productivity to 
generate ES (table 7), HT (table 9) and MS (table 11) VC 
investments in countries with higher level of articles 
published. Once again, results are confirmed interacting 
PR&D in countries with low (Ps_r+d*Art_pub_low) and 
high (Ps_r+d*Art_pub_high) level of articles published 
(column 1) and 3-year average public spending on R&D 
with low (Ps_r+d_3 year* Inst_Art_pub_3 year) and high 
(Ps_r+d_3 year* Art_pub_high_3 year) 3-year average 
articles published (column 2). An issue of interest is that 
coefficients associated with the relationship between ES, 
HT and MS venture capital investments and PR&D 
interacting with high level of articles published increases its 
value 1.4, 1.7 and 2.1 times compared with coefficients 
associated to the relationship between total venture capital 
investments and PR&D, interacting with high level of 
articles published.  
Table 10 
Manufacturing VC and Inst_Qual 
Independent variables Manufacturing VC investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d 269,11     
  (56.96)***     
Ps_r+d_3 year  287,91   
   (52.01)***   
Ps_r+d*   212,88  
 Inst_qual_low   (62.36)***  
Ps_r+d*   299,91  
 Inst_qual_high   (59.03)***  
Ps_r+d_3 year*    200,69 
 Inst_qual_low_3 year    (68.61)*** 
Ps_r+d_3 year*     312,86 
 Inst_qual_high_3 
year    (58.07)*** 
Inst_qual 0,62 0,63 0,41 0,43 
  (0.18)*** (0.17)*** (0.19)** (0.19)** 
Mar_cap 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Art_pub 0,016 0,016 0,015 0,015 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
GDP 0,002 0,003 0,001 0,002 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -0,372 -0,433 -0,098 -0,069 
  (0.253) (0.232) (0.272) (0.299) 
Time dummies no yes no yes 
R² 0,380 0,354 0,392 0,379 
Observations 403 438 403 387 
Countries 39 39 39 37 
Model  PCSE, ar(1), het 
 
Last results are in line with the efficiency of PR&D 
conceptual framework (Conte et al., 2009). PR&D is a 
framework input whose primary objective is to produce an 
output, represented in increasing the innovative output 
(efficiency) and consequently to yield an outcome signified 
in rising competiveness, productivity and economic growth 
(effectiveness). Innovative output may be proxy by articles 
published (Moed et al., 1985; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979) 
therefore, a larger number of articles published imply higher 
PR&D efficiency. Thus, our greater coefficients obtained in 
the last paragraph indicate PR&D is more productive to 
fostering ES, HT and MS venture capital investments in 
countries with higher PR&D efficiency (more opportunities 
for VC investments) and should be inferred, better PR&D 
effectiveness (greater return for VC investments). Finally, 
the pattern founded in the relation between total VC 
investments and PR&D interacting with road network 
conserves the same behavior for ES (table 7) and HT (table 
9), but not for MS (table 11) venture capital investments. 
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For the first two, again the effect of PR&D on VC is stronger 
in countries with low infrastructure. This is confirmed using 
PR&D (column 3) and 3-year average PR&D (column 4) 
interacting with total previous year and 3-year average road 
network for countries below and above of the sample media 
(Ps_r+d*Road_low,Ps_r+d*Road_high, 
Ps_r+d*Road_low_3 year and Ps_r+d*Road_high_3 year, 
respectively). The coefficients are positive, significant and 
its magnitude is higher in countries with lower road network 
for both cases. 
Table 11  
Manufacturing VC, Road Paved and Art_Pub 
Independent variables Manufacturing VC investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ps_r+d* 162,66    
 Art_pub_low (60.39)***    
Ps_r+d* 337,11    
\ Art_pub_high (52.03)***    
Ps_r+d_3 year*  159,39   
 Art_pub_low_3 year  (45.25)***   
Ps_r+d_3 year*  343,97   
 Art_pub_high_3 year  (41.64)***   
Ps_r+d*   196,62  
 Road_low   (74.79)***  
Ps_r+d*   202,25  
 Road_high   (66.02)***  
Ps_r+d*    243,49 
 Road_low_3 year    (62.16)*** 
Ps_r+d*    257,73 
 Road_high_3 year    (54.83)*** 
Inst_qual 0,726 0,728 0,408 0,530 
  (0.179)*** (0.122)*** (0.226)* (0.209)** 
Mar_cap 0,001 0,001 0,004 0,003 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)** (0.002) 
Art_pub 0,009 0,009 0,014 0,014 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
GDP 0,003 0,008 0,020 0,012 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)* (0.009) 
Constant -0,342 -0,472 -0,304 -0,432 
  (0.240) (0.159) (0.277) (0.221)** 
Time dummies No yes No yes  
R² 0,42 0,50 0,40 0,37 
Observations 403 438 352 410 
Countries 39 39 38 39 
Model  PCSE, ar(1), het 
 
The relation between MS venture capital investments and 
PR&D interacting with road network shows a different 
behavior. PR&D is more productive generating MS venture 
capital investments in countries where level of road network 
is high (table 11). The result is checked using PR&D (column 
3) and 3-year average PR&D (column 4) interacting with total 
previous year and 3-year average road network for countries 
below and above of the sample media 
(Ps_r+d*Road_low,Ps_r+d*Road_high, 
Ps_r+d*Road_low_3 year and Ps_r+d*Road_high_3 year, 
respectively). Having greater road network increases 
significantly the positive effect of PR&D on motivating new 
MS venture capital commitments to get in the profitability 
chase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
We use a large panel of 40 countries over the 1998 to 
2012 to identify the impact of PR&D on venture capital 
investment. We use the Thomson ONE Database, which 
includes data of 276.051 venture capital deals in the studied 
period. We find that PR&D has a sizeable effect on venture 
capital investments: numerically, an increase of 1 % in 
PR&D as a share of GDP increases the VC investments on 
average 36,620.7 dollars per inhabitant economically active. 
This effect is relatively higher in countries with higher level 
of institutional quality, and higher level of articles 
published. Also, we find that PR&D is more important for 
the generation of VC investments in countries with lower 
infrastructure.   
Effects mentioned above hold for different VC 
investment proxies and stand when we correct for possible 
endogeneity in venture capital investment series, by using a 
difference and system GMM dynamic panel estimator 
model with a collapsed instrument matrix and two lags, 
obtaining more robust conclusions. The effect of PR&D on 
VC investments is robust accounting other time and country 
characteristics which has been considered in the literature as 
important determinants of VC activity.  
Also, we find that PR&D is specifically important for 
Early Stage (ES), High Technology (HT) and 
Manufacturing Sector (MS) venture capital investments. 
Institutional quality increases the positive effect of PR&D 
on ES, HT and MS venture capital investments. Results 
show that the influence of PR&D is greater in countries with 
higher institutional quality for three kinds of VC 
investments studied. However, For ES-VC investment, 
PR&D looses its significance when the institutional quality 
is low, indicating that institutional quality is critical for 
these kinds of investments. We also find that PR&D 
increases its productivity to generate ES, HT and MS VC 
investments in countries with higher level of articles 
published. These results are in line with the efficiency of 
PR&D conceptual framework (Conte et al., 2009) and with 
the Knowledge Spillover approaches from Leyden and Link 
(1991), David et al. (1992) and Acs et al. (2009). 
Finally, the pattern found in the relation between 
total VC investments and PR&D interacting with road 
network maintains the same behavior for ES and HT but not 
for MS venture capital investments. PR&D is more 
productive generating MS venture capital investments in 
countries where level of road network is high. Having 
greater road network increases significantly the positive 
effect of PR&D in the motivation of new MS venture capital 
commitments. However, the effect of PR&D on ES and HT 
VC investments is stronger in countries with low 
infrastructure, the conclusion is that in these last kind of 
countries PR&D becomes more important, and they should 
make a greater effort in PR&D to increase the volume of VC 
activity. All our results strongly suggest that PR&D is 
conductive to generating and increasing the attractiveness of 
venture capital investment opportunities.  
In this paper we seek to address how PR&D can 
affect some factors that could increase or reduce the 
expected rate of return for VC investments. Outcomes 
indicate that as aggregated economic the net effect is 
positive, and PR&D does seem to generate value through 
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fostering VC activity in the economy. However, a number 
of important questions remain unanswered due to the nature 
of our data. For example, what is the relative importance of 
the different channels via which PR&D affect VC 
investments? A second question arises to establish what 
kind of PR&D is more productive in generating VC activity; 
further research could classify PR&D according to its short-
time objectives (basic or applied) or according with the 
strategy used (for example, Tax incentives or direct 
subsidies). A third issue to be analyzed could be to 
determinate how PR&D impacts VC investment in different 
economic sectors.  Future research can greatly contribute by 
addressing those questions.  
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